


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
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【South Vietnam: Military activity remained light over the weekend as the Communists generally observed their cease-fire.

Only minor enemy truce violations, mostly exchanges of small-arms fire, have been reported since the Communist-declared cease-fire began on the morning of 15 February. A number of small ground actions resulted from continuing allied offensive sweeps, however, and a four-hour battle initiated by South Vietnamese troops in the delta cost the Viet Cong 49 dead. In Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon enemy gunners shot down three US helicopters, killing five Americans and wounding 18.

The allied 24-hour cease-fire has been marred by firing incidents in widespread parts of the country. No significant fighting has developed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Map) ]

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Poland: Party leader Gomulka and his erstwhile challenger, hard-line party secretary Moczar, are making an attempt to paper over the gulf between them.

They have found common cause in attacking the Western broadcasts about factionalism within the Polish party, most of which have been beamed into Poland by Radio Free Europe (RFE). These reports have been widely heard and believed.

Speaking to the Warsaw party organization on 8 February, Gomulka stressed stability and party unity, and blasted "foreign reports" of discord among the leadership. Gomulka singled out programs concerning "comrade Moczar" for condemnation, calling them "trash, base fabrications," and "provocative lies." On the same day, Moczar spoke out against RFE's "deceitful information meant to split the unity and cohesion of our society."

Last year Moczar launched the most serious challenge since 1956 to Gomulka's leadership. In view of the Czechoslovak situation, his timing was bad. The Soviets supported Gomulka, and the party rank and file followed suit. Gomulka received a new lease on life at the party congress last November. Since then, he has worked toward healing the party's wounds. Moczar seems to be carrying out his part of a probable compromise agreement.

This truce may be only temporary. Gomulka evidently remains cautious, and wants to prevent Moczar from building on last year's political power base. Last month, for example, Gomulka reportedly purged a number of lesser ranking Moczar supporters from the party-government bureaucracy, apparently for failing to respect the stress, since the congress, on party unity.

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NOTES

Cyprus: Glafkos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiator in the intercommunal talks with the Turkish Cypriots, has said that Athens' interference in Cypriot politics has made his position untenable and is threatening to resign. Clerides also claims that the rigid attitude of his Greek Cypriot colleagues on Turkish Cypriot demands for local authority will bar any further progress in the talks. Should he resign, the talks would be imperiled. [REDACTED]

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\* \* \* \*

Indonesia - Communist China: The Indonesian Foreign Ministry has been rebuffed in its opening gambit toward diplomatic relations with Communist China. When it sent word recently to Peking, via Rumania which represents Chinese interests in Djakarta, that Indonesia would be receptive to Chinese initiatives, Peking reportedly replied that any initiatives must come from Indonesia because it, not China, had suspended relations in 1967.

The process of restoring relations is likely to be prolonged. Paralleling the shadow boxing on initiatives between Indonesia and China will be the Indonesian domestic controversy between the Foreign Ministry and the military. Although the military agree that resumed ties will be necessary eventually, they are concerned that subversion would accompany a Chinese presence in Indonesia and they would like to postpone a Chinese diplomatic return as long as possible. [REDACTED]

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